Why a war against Saddam is crucial to the future of deterrence.
View this article at The Weekly Standard
THE QUESTION of what to do about Iraq–and moving down the track, what to do about North Korea–typically gets described as a choice between deterrence and preemption (or perhaps better, “prevention”). If Saddam Hussein can be contained and deterred from using weapons of mass destruction, as some contend, then there is no need to go to war against him. If, on the other hand, we cannot be confident that he can be deterred, then preventive action is necessary. Reaching the latter conclusion is generally considered a doctrinal leap–a declaration of no confidence in the theory and practice of deterrence.
This idea of a radical break with past practice and past theory is embraced by both sides–by the advocates of deterrence and by the partisans of prevention. In the case of the former, the movement from deterrence to prevention represents a rejection of time-tested means of dealing with adversaries in favor of the always risky course of waging aggressive war–and losing in the bargain the justification of necessity, thus imperiling the moral legitimacy of our cause. For the advocates of prevention, it’s good riddance to deterrence. Now that an alternative is available, who needs a doctrine that keeps the peace only at a level of utmost precariousness?
Tod Lindberg 